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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WEBER COUNTY,
Appellant,
vs.

DAVIS COUNTY,

Case No.
12861

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Weber County brought an action against Davis
County for recovery of costs incurred by Weber County for medical care rendered to eleven indigent sick
residents of Davis County.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court below denied Weber County's claim and
decided that there is no liability on the part of Davis
County to reimburse Weber County for costs incurred
in caring for indigent sick persons named in the pleadmgs.
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SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the decision of
the lower court.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The claim asserted by \\T eber County in the case at
bar is for medical care rendered to eleven Davis County
residents at Weber County l\Iemorial liospital.
At least seven of these patients were admitted to
Weber County l\Iemorial Hospital from private hospitals in Weber County. One was admitted from a
private hospital in Salt Lake County. Two were admitted from home. (Tr. 28, 32, 67, 75, 76, 77, 79, 84, 85).
There is no evidence that any were admitted from the
scene of an accident.
Four of the patients were intitially admitted to
'Veber County :Memorial Hospital in 19G6. Three were
initially admitted in 1967. Two were admitted in 1968.
Two were admitted in 1969 (Tr. 7, 10, 23, 32, 33, 34, 36,
37, 38).
Davis County was not notified prior to the admission of any of these patients. Notice to Davis County
that any Davis County residents had been admitted to
eber l\ilemorial Hospital was given only after the
patients had already been admitted. ('I'r. 49, 68, 70, 72,
74, 77, 78, 84, 126).

"T
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Davis County did not agree to pay 'Veber County
anything. Nor did Davis County affirm, authorize or
ratify any action taken by Weber County concerning
any of these patients.
However, there is no evidence that Davis County
has ever ref used to comply with its statutory obligation
to care for the indigent sick and dependent poor. In
fact, Davis County has complied with Utah Code Ann.,
§ l 7-5-55.5 (Supp. 1971), hy depositing an a ppropriation with the State Treasurer, and with Utah Code
Ann.,§ 17-5-55(1953), by maintaining an indigent account.
Each of the patients named in the pleadings was a
recipient of welfare. The claim Weber is asking is over
and above the amount paid by welfare, social security,
family and other sources. \V eber is asking Davis to pay
the balance.
ARGUl\1ENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW RENDERED A
l\lEl\IORANDUl\1 DEC IS I 0 N AND PREPARED FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH RESPONDED TO AND COVERED ALL OF THE
MATERIAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE
PLEADINGS.
Appellant avers generally that the findings of
fact are deficient in scope. Appellant's Brief at 7.
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Uespondent concedes as a matter of law that findings of fact must respond to and cover all of the material issues raised by the pleadings, Simper v. Brown, 74
U. 178, 278 P. 5:W ( 1929), and failure to do so is reversible error, where the failure is prejudicial,
Investment Co. v. 111 orrison, 3 U. 2d 43, 278 P. 2<l 284
( 19;)4), but denies that the trial court committed such
error in the case at har.
The Utah Supreme Court has taken the position
that it will not re\·erse a trial court on the facts of a
law case unless there is error of law, and the burden is
upon the appellant to convince the court that the trial
court committed error. Brigham v. IJ!oon Lal1:c Electric
Association, 24 U. 2d 2B2, 470 P. 2d 393 (1970).
Appellant has not shown a single instance where
the trial court failed to respond to a material issue raised
in the pleadings. All appellant has shown is that appellant disagrees with the court's findings.
The memorandum decision and the findings of
fact, which may properly be considered together,
Sprague t'. Bo,lllcs Bros. Drilling Co .. 4 U 2cl 344, 294
P. 2d 689 ( 1956), clearly respond to and cover all the
material issues raised by the pleadings.
\Vhether the court's findings are supported by the
evidence is the issue of the following point.

POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF FACT BELO\V ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
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FAIRLY REFLECT THE \VEIGIIT OF TlIE
EVIDENCE.
Appellant contends that the findings of fact below do not fairly reflect the weight of the evidence.
Appellant's Brief at 7.
In order to prevail, appellant must not only show
there is error, hut that the error is substantial and prejudicial.
'Vhen a matter such as the case at bar is on appeal,
"all presumptions favor the validity of the verdict and
judgment; and they will not be overturned unless the
attacker shows that there is error which is substantial
and prejudicial in the sense there is reasonable liklihood
that in its absence the result would have been different."
,'-,'impson v. General 1llotors Corporation, 24 U. 2d 301,
305, 470 p. 2cl 399 ( 1970).

The Supreme Court is "obliged to assume that the
trial court believed those aspects of the evidence, and
drew such reasonable inferences as could fairly be drawn
therefrom in the light favorable to the sustaining of
his findings and judgment." JV. P. 11 arlin Const. Co.
v. Continental Baul.: & 1.1rust Co., 23 U. 2d 422, 424,
464 P. 2d 585 (1970).

Even where a case is tried to the court without a
jury, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to sustain the findings of the court and judgment based thereon. Lake Creek Irrigation Company v.
Clyde, 22 U. 2d 222, 451 P. 2d 875 (1969).
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In the case at bar appellm1t disagrees with findings
No. 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Appellant's Brief at 12 & 13.
l\Iere disagreement is not grounds for reversal.
The Utah Supreme Court docs not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even if it should disagree
with the trial court's finding where there is competent
evidence to support the finding. Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18
U. 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 ( 1967).

Each of the findings is supported by competent
evidence.
Finding No. 4 provides, "There appears to have
been no emergency in the admission of any of the
patients.. " In challenging that finding, appellant contends that "[t]here is
evidence of emergency within the meaning of that term as applied in the Cache Valley case.'' Appellant's Brief at 12. (emphasis added).
It is of interest to note that the definition given by the
court in Cache Valley, is that "the necessity for attention must be most urgent." Cache Valley General llospital r. Cache Couuty, 92 U. 279, 288, 67 P.2d 639
(1937).

There is no evidence that any of the patients named
in the pleadings came from the scene of an accident or
any other location in such condition that the necessity
for attention was most urgent.
Respondent concedes that the patients were in need
of some kind of medical and nursing care, but denies
that any emergency existed. Just because a patient

7

needs and in fact receives medical attention does not
mean that an emergency exists. Age, infirmity, senility,
and the other conditions of the patients in the case at bar
do not constitute the kind of emergency described in the
Cache Valley case.
The trial court did not err in finding that no
emergency existed. Jfot, even if the court did err m
such finding \\T eber County still cannot prevail.
The general rule is that before a county becomes
liable to third parties in any case for medical care of
an indigent sick person, the county must be notified and
give its authorization. Cache Valley General llospital v.
Cache Connt.7J, supra. I-lowever, in a proper case, where
there is an emergency, the county must respond even
though there is no authorization, the proper case being
one where the person cared for is one for whom the
county is ultimately liable. Even in an emergency there is a tight limit: "[A ]ny one who gives relief
in an emergency because the matter is too imminent to
permit of the obtaining of authorization must at the
first opportunity get in contact with those who are
liable and obtain authorization for further care. If that
is not given, he can only recoup for such services and
care as are necessary to administer so as to put the party
in a condition where he may be safely removed." Id at
290.

In the case at bar there was no authorization from
Davis County. Nor has there been enough evidence to
show that any of the patients were in such a condition
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that they could not have been removed prior to the time
they were in fact terminated.
Tims the most that '\T eher County could recover
under any theory is the recoupment for emergency
treatment. Before it could recover from Davis County
on that theory it would have to establish that Davis
County is ultimately liable. The statute doesn't impose
liability on the county of residence. J\ s discussed in
--Point IV of this Brief, infra, the county where the
indigent person is found is liable, regardless of the indigent 's residency.
Since Davis County is not

"r

liable as a

matter of law,
eher County cannot recover from
Davis County even where there is an emergeucy.
'fhe trial court found that four of the patients
were admitted in 1H6H, three were admitted in 1967, two
were admitted in 1968, and two were admitted in 1969.
Appellant contests that finding. Appellant's Brief at
12. There is really no room for dispute. Appellant's

own Brief supports the firnling ! Patients Goldsberry,
Murphy, Robins, ancl Shirarnizu were admitted in 1966.
Patients Bodily, Bodily ancl Taylor were admitted in
1967. Patients Fib;patrick ancl "\Villey were admitted
in 1968. Patients Bishop and Seagrist were admitted in
1969. Appellant's Brief at 2. The record also supports
the finding. (Tr. 7, 10, 23, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38).
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Appellant also contests finding No. 7, wherein
the court found that Davis County was not contacted
at the time of admission of any of these patients. Any
notice Davis County received was in all instances after
the admission had been accomplished. In fact, the first
notice to Davis County was in l''ebruary 1968 after
over one-half of the patients named in the pleadings
had already been admitted. Notice given after :February
19()8 was never prior to or at the admission of any patient, but always after the admission. (Tr. 49, 68, 70,
72, 74, 77, 78, 84, 110, 126.)
Finding No. 8, which Appellant contests, is also
supported by the evidence. According to all the testimony at the trial, the first notice to Davis County was
executed in February 1968, (Tr. ·1<9, 74, 77, 124), and in
1970 a demand was made as a "prelude to suit required
by statute." Appellant's Brief at 13; (Tr. 66).
The final finding which Appellant contests is No.
9 which provides "Davis County did not agree to pay
"\Veber County anything, nor did Davis affirm, authorize or ratify any action taken by 'V" eber County concerning any of these patients."
There is no evidence whatsoever that Davis County
entered into any agreement to pay 'V" eher. Furthermore,
the record is void of any evidence that would show Davis
County affirmed, authorized or ratified any action
taken by W eher. In fact it is clear that Davis County
did not intend to pay Weber County anything, and so
informed Weber County. (Tr. 112, 113.)
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Appellant contends that the court helow failed "to
reach the issue raised by plaintiff's demand and defenclant's responsive demurrer to the Weber County
proposal to turn out or discharge the Davis County indigent patients (T 64-65)". Appellant's Brief at 13.
That is not really an issue. It was not raised in the
pleadings. It is merely some testimony for the court to
consider with all other testimony in making a decision.
Furthermore, even if Commissioner Smoot said what he
is alleged to have said, (Tr. 64-65), which he says he
has no knowledge of, (Tr. 115), that does not detract
from any of the court's findings.
Appellant has not shown any error whatsoever
on the 1)art of the trial court concerning the findings
of fact. Rather, each finding is supported by the evi·
dence and the findings fairly reflect the weight of the
evidence.
POINT III
TI-IJ?. TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT THE CARE RENDERED TO DAVIS
COUNTY INDIGENTS BY \VEBER COUNTY
WAS VOLUNTARY.
By Appellant's own argument, all of the patients
named in the pleadings were hospitalized on the order
of u physician whose judgment was reviewed by a hospital board. Appellant's Brief at 12. The fair inference
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to be made from that representation is that the admission of the patients was not necessarily based upon
compelling and urgent circumstances, but upon administrative decision. Just as they were admitted by administrative decision, so were most of them likewise discharged. (Tr. 87). That is not inconsistent with the
court's conclusion.
Furthermore, most of the patients came to "\Veber
County :Memorial Hospital from other hospitals. There
is no evidence that \V eber County had to receive them.
The lower court based his conclusion upon the evidence
before it. The evidence and reasonable inferences to
be drawn from the evidence substantiate the conclusion
on the grounds there was no contract to take these
patients, there was no emergency associated with the
admission, and as will be discussed in the next point of
the Brief, there was no legal responsibility on the part
of Davis County to pay '¥ eber County anything.
Therefore, the care rendered by Weber County
must necessarily, as a matter of law, have been given
on a voluntary basis as far as Davis County is concerned.

POINT IV
DAVIS COUNTY IIAS NO OBLIGATION
TO WEBER COUNTY FOR THE CARE,
ANC:E. OR RELIEF OF ANY INDIGENT SICK PERSON.
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The only obligation any county has concerning
care of the indigent sick is statutory. As a matter of
historical fact there is " ... no common law or constitutional duty to support [the] poor. (Citations omitted)." Allen v. Grahmn, 446 P.2d 240, 243 (Ariz.
1968). Aid to the indigent sick and dependent poor is
solely a matter of statutory enactment. See 41 Am.
Jur., Poor and Poor Laws, § :18 ( 1H42) ; 70 C.J.S.,
Paupers, § 67 ( 19;31).
Utah does Jiave a statute in effect which requires
each county to take some action in caring for the indigent sick and dependent poor. Utah Code Ann., § 17-5-55
( 1953). The obligation of a county under that statute
to pr<H'ide assistance for the medically indigent is satisfiled by depositing a designated appropriation 'vith the
State Treasurer. Utah Code Ann., § 17-5-5.5.5 (Supp.
1971). That issue is discussed in the next point.
'Veher County contends that since it treated mdigent sick Davis County residents, it is entitled to recover from Davis County. There is no statute in Utah
which imposes an obligation on any county to make payments to another county for care of any indigent sick
person. The majority view is that liability for relief
furnished by others is wholly a matter of statute. See
70 C.J.S., Paupers,§ 72 (1951).

lV eber County relies on Ogden City v. TV ebcr
County, 26 U. 129, 72 P. 433 ( 1903), to support its
contention that one county may look to another for recovery of expenses outlayed to aid medically indigent
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non-residents. That case does not stand for that proposition. The issue in that case was "whether, under our
laws, it is the duty of the county commissioners to provide and care for ... non-resident poor ... " Id. at 131.
(emphasis added).
The court in that case discussed the issue whether
a county within whose boundaries a pauper is found
can ref use to give assistance merely because the pauper
is a resident of another county. The Utah Supreme
Court concluded that a county is obligated to provide
care, maintenance and relief of non-residents as well
as residents found within the county. The court explained however, that where "the applicant for aid is
a non-resident, it is doubtless also the duty of [the board
of commissioners] to remove him, as soon as practicable,
to the county or state of his residence." Id. at 133 (emphasis added). There was no discussion whatever concerning recovery of costs incurred from the county of
the pauper's residence. The court did explain very clearly that the county where the indigent sick person is
found-be he resident or non-resident-has a statutory
obligation to provide relief. Thus, where a non-resident
eber County, it was
indigent sick man was found in
the duty of
County to care for him. In that case
Weber County refused; Ogden City then rendered assistance to the man. Ogden City was allowed to recover
from Weber County.
Therefore, Ogden City v. Weber County, supra,
holds that as between a city and a county, the county
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has the statutorv obligation to aid a non-resident indi bO'ent sick person. That case did not deal with the kind
of request 'Veber County is making in the case at bar.
The very most that case provides in the way of doctrine
concerning inter-county obligation, is that where a
county has a non-resident indigent sick person within
its boundaries it must provide relief and then remove
such person as soon as practicable to the county of his
residence.
Davis County is not attempting to express any affirmative duty 'Veber County may have. Davis County is merely contending that the Ogden Citv v. TV ever
Count,lj case does not support "\Veber County in the case
at bar. ·
It is of interest to note that even where a county
is obligated to assist indigent poor persons, the obligation is not unlimited. Statutory limits may be imposed.
In Cache Valley General FI ospital v. Cache Countv, 92
U 279, 67 P. 2d 639 ( 1937), the Utah Supreme Court
explained that the amount of money available to a county for the care, maintenance and relief of the indigent
sick and dependent poor may he limited by statute.
"Then that case was decided there was a statute in effect
limiting the levy for the care of indigent to one mill.
The court held that the county has a duty to provide
such assistance "only up to the point where the county
may reasonably do so within its funds raised for that
purpose. And there must be some discretion in the county commissioners." Id. at 287. Therefore, just as an obli-
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gation can be imposed by statute upon a county to care
for the indigent, so too can that obligation be limited by
statute.
Since the Utah Supreme Court decided the Cache
Valley General II ospital case in 1937, a very sophisticated and elaborate program providing care for the
needy has been developed. This program is commonly
referred to as Public 'V el fare.
Federal statutes and funds are involved. 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 to 1396. So too are state statutes and
funds involved. Utah Code Ann., § 55-15-1 to 55-15-39
(Supp. 1971). If the state complies with the federal
statute, then it is eligible for federal funds. One requirement of the state in order to qualify for medical
assistance funds is that the state establish a plan which
"shall be in ef'fect in all political subdivisions of the
State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory
upon them." 42 U.S.C.A., § 1396(a) (a) (1).
Utah has estahlshed a public welfare plan which
is in effect in all counties. As indicated in the preceeding paragraph in order for Utah to qualify for fecleral
assistance, the plan in Utah must be uniform throughout every county.
In 1967 the Utah Legislature enacted a statute
which enabled each of the counties in the state to take
full advantage of the medical assistance program set up
under federal and state law. The act relates to the care
of the medically indigent and provides that each county
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pay a minimum sum into a central funcl to be used to
provide for hospital ancl medical cure for the medically
indigent of every county. Utah Code Ann.§ 17-5-55.5
(Supp. 1971).
Therefore, since ally obligation a county may have
to assist the medically indigent may be limited by statute, awl since Utah has a statute which limits a county's
obligation, then by complying with that statute a county has no further obligation.
The only obligation Davis County has concerning
medically indigent persons who are on welfare, is to the
State of Utah. Davis County has no obligation whatsoever to any other county.

POINT V
TIIE ONL \'" FIN 1\NCIAL OBLIGATION
DA YIS COU.:\''l'Y lfAS CONCEHNING l\JEDIC AL AND IIOSPITAL CARE FOR ANY
P:EHSONS DE'fERl\JINED TO BE l\IEDICALLY INDIGENT IS SATISFIED BY DEPOSITING I\N APPHOPIUA'l'ION 'VITII THE
STATE TREASUHER PUllSUANT TO U7'All
CODE ANN.,§ 17-5-55.5 (Supp. 1971).
Utah Code Ann.,§ 17-5-5.3 ..5 (Supp. 1971), was
enacted in 1967 to enable each and every county to take
advantage of the fetleral and state medical assistance
programs. The main thrust of this provision is to provide uniform care to all of the medically indigent per·
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sons in the State of Utah, regardless of their place of
residence. The State of Utah is completely responsible
for administering the program involving medical assistance to the indigent sick and dependent poor persons.
The counties are able to fulfill any obligation they have
mill
in this regard by paying a maximum one-half (
levy to the State Treasurer. Atfy Gen. Op., 68-0.52
(Utah 1!)68) .
Of course, compliance with Utah Code Ann.,§ 175-55.5 (Supp. 1971), does not relieve counties of the
obligation to care for indigent sick persons who are not
eligible to receive any assistance under the state program. Compliance does however, relieve counties "of
the responsibility of caring for the indigent sick ... in
those irn.;tances where the indigent sick qualify for medical or hospital assistance under programs administered
by [the UiYision of Family Services]." Att'y Gen. Op.>
68-058 (Utah 1968) .
"Since Section 17-5-55.5 fixes the limits of the
responsibility of a County for care of 1he medically indigent, it cannot pay public funds in excess of the payments called for by that section for aid to the medically indigent." Att'y Gen. Op., 69-0!)3 (Utah 1969).
The State has the sole discretion in determining
who is medically indigent for purposes of Utah Code
Ann., § 17-5-55.5 (Supp. 1971). However, ·where the
State has made the determination that any person is
medically indigent, then any obligation a c01tnty may
have concerning medical and hospital care for such a
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person is satisfied blJ compl!Jing rrith Section 17-5-55.5.
A tt'!J Gc11. 0 p., ()H-080 (Utah 1969).
Davis County does not ignore its obligation under
Utah Code Ann.,§ 17-5-5;) (1953), to "provide for the
care, maintenance and relief of all indigent sick or
otherwise dependent poor persons who have lawfully
settled in any part of the county . . . " Davis County
has established an "indigent" account which has been
in effect several years and from which thousands of
dollars are drawn annually to provide a variety of essential services for the needy. :No elaboration of that
will he made here for the simple reason it is not relevant to the issue in the case at bar.
The issue here has to do with the obligation of
Da,'is County to provide care, maintenance :rnd relid'
of indigent sick persons found in VVeber County, who
have been determined by the State to he medically indigent and have received medical assistance from the
State.
The parties to the action in the case at bar stipulated that each of the patients named in the pleadings was
medically indigent and qualified for public assistance.·
(Tr. 2).
Therefore, since all of the persons involved in
'Veber County's daim have been determined to he
"medically indigent", and since Davis County has complied with Utah Code Ann.,§ 17-5-55.5 (Supp. 1971),
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then Davis County has no further financial obligation
with respect to these medically indigent persons.
(:For the sake of convenience, all of the Attorney
General Opinions involved are attached to this Brief
and designated as "Appendix").
CONCLUSION
'V eher County has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
In the first instance 'V eber has not shown any
error on the part of the court below.
Secondly, Weber has not shown that one county
can recover from another county for aid rendered to the
indigent sick in any circumstance. There is no statute
which allows YVeher County to look to Davis County,
or which would require Davis County to pay anything
to v\Teber County.
Thirly, the statutory scheme upon which our Family Assistance Program is based, absolutely precludes
one county from looking to another for recovery.
If 'Veber County is allowed to prevail, then, in
spite of the federal requirement that the plan be uniform in every county, one county could look to another
to pay money over and beyond the limit established by
statute. That could have several adverse consequences.
It could render the counties ineligible altogether from
participating in the State Welfare Program, as funded
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by the federal government. It could put each County
Commission in a position of having no discretion whatsoever when another county comes forward with demarnls to pay for medical care of indigent sick persons.
Furthermore, if Weber is allowed to prevail then
it would require the court to create legislation. There is
no statutory authority for "\-Veber's claim. Nor is there
any common law authority, which means in the absence
of statute, \Veber cannot prevail unless the court acts
as a legislative body and creates appropriate legislation.
Davis County never authorized, affirmed or ratified any action 'Veber took. 'Veber has not come forward with any theory upon which the court could grant
its claims in absence of authorization, affirmation, or
ratification.
E,·en if \Veher came forward with such a theory
i.e., emergency, it still can't prevail because, (I) there
is no statutory obligation by one county to another in
a case like this, and ( 2) Davis has satisfied all of its
affirmative statutory obligations, which as indicated by
the Attorney General Opinions, prepared by two different Attorneys General, satisfies all financial obligations with respect to the medically indigent.
Therefore, Davis County respectfully submits that
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'Veber County's claim be denied, and that the judgment
of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

BENNETT P. PETERSON
Davis County Attorney

Attorney for Respondent
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of Defendant's Brief in the above entitled matter to Robert
C. Newey, 2471 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah, 84401,
on this ............ day of June 1972.
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH

OPINION OF LAJY
No. 68-052
Requested by .Mr. B. H. llarris, Cache County Attorney, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah.
Prepared by Attorney General Phil L. Hansen and
staff.
QUESTIONS
1.

Are county commissioners required to provide for
the care and maintenance of the indigent sick and
dependent poor not otherwise cared for which are
found within their county?

2.

Does the Utah Code Ann. ( 1967) set forth the
manner in which county commissioners are to fulfill their duties to provide for the care and maintenanee of the indigent sick and the dependent poor
not otherwise cared for which arc found within
their county?
CONCLUSION
1.

Yes.

2.

Yes.
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OPINION
The duties of counties with regard to the care
and maintenance of indigent sick and dependent poor
are not specifically enumerated in the statutes. The code
does state:
1.

They may provide for the care, maintenance
and relief of all indigent sick or otherwise dependent poor persons who have lawfully
settled in any part of the county, including
that territory or portion thereof lying within the limits of any incorporated city or town
situated in the county; and it is hereby made
the duty of each board of county commissioners to provide such care, maintenance and
relief for the indigent sick and dependent
poor, whether found within or without the
corporate limits of incorporated cities or
towns .... 1
The question immediately that presents itself is whether
the above provision is a mandatory direction by the
Utah State Legislature or a permissive authorization.
\'Vhile the use of the \vord "may'' sometimes entitles the
reader to conclude the provision is merely permissive,
it does not render the conclusion inescapable:
The word 'may' in a statute will be construed
to mean 'shall' whenever the rights of the pub1

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.

§

17-5-55 (1962).
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lie or of third persons depend upon the exercise of the power of the performance of the
duty to whieh it refers, and such is its meaning
in all eases where the public interests and
rights are concerned, or a public duty is imposed upon public officers, and the public or
third persons have a claim de j nre that the
power shall be exercised. 2
The statute itself is mandatory: " ... it is hereby made
the duty of each board of county commissioners to provide such care. maintenance and relief fur the indigent
siek and dependent poor . . . . " This language argues
against a permissive construction. 'l'o view the provisions as mandatory would be consistent with the view
that public duty requires an enlightened person to provide for those penurious individuals who are unable to
care for themselves.
Justice llartch, speaking, for the Utah State Supreme
Court, saicl:
The enactment '"'as made jn the interest of
humanity and mercy, and must receiYe a liberal
construction, so as to carry into effect the
humane and benevolent policy adopted by the
legislature. 3
2

3

Board of County Cmnm'rs v. State, 369 P.2d 537, 542 (Wyo.
1962).
Ogden City v. Weber County, 26 Utah 129, 72 Pac. 433, 434
(1903).
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If, as the high tribunal held in the Ogden City case,
it is the duty of the county tc provide for care of the
transient poor f ouncl within the county in a helpless
condition, then woul<l a resident of the county similarly
situated be entitled to county assistance? An affirmative reply is fairly compelled because the statute under
consideration in the Ogden Cil.1J case was interpreted to
mean "all" indigent sick within a county.
Does the Utah Code Ann. (1967) set forth
the manner in which county commissioners are to fulfill their duties to provide for the care and maintenance
of the indigent sick and the dependent poor not otherwise cared for which are found within their county?
2.

In HH37, the Utah State Legislature enacted an
addition to llepl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-55
( 1962), which enumerates in detail the method by which
the county commissions may fulfill their responsibilities to the medically indigent. The secton states:
Each and every county commission shall appropriate from the general funds of the county an amount of money not to exceed the
equiYalent of a Y2 mill levy which, in its judgment, based upon historical experience and projected need as determined in consultation
with the state department of public welfare,
shall be equal to one-third ( 1/3) of the anticipated annual costs of medical treatment and
hospitalization for the medically indigent, but
in no event shall such annual appropriation be
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less than one hundred dollars ( $100). l\1 oneys
so appropriated shall be deposited with the
state treasurer who shall credit the same to a
hospital and medical care account.
Eligibility requirements for hospital and
medical care shall be determined by the state
department of public welfare and shall be uniform for all counties. Payment for such care
shall be made by the department or division
of state government administering the Public
Assistance Act of HHH upon notification to
the county in whieh the indigent resides for
'd1om payment is being made and the county
commissioners agree. Disbursement from the
hospital and medical care account shall be made
only for costs accrued in excess of care limits
otherwise established for the care of such patients by the state department or division administering the Public Assistance Act of
1961. 4

The above provision enables each of the counties
in the State of Utah to take full advantage of Title
19 of Public Law 8!H)7 of the "Social Security Amendments of 19u5," which is a medical assistance program
financed in a large part hy the federal government. It
appears to provide a tremendous advantage occurring
to each of the counties of the State of Utah under the
new section, for :
4

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.

§

17-5-55.5 (Supp. 1967).

All of the me1lically indigent in the State
of Utah will receive uniform care, regardless
of their place of residence.
1.

2. The county itself will not have to pay full
costs since the federal government will underwrite the major portion of the program.
The effect of this new section will be the transfer
of the administration of all hospitals and medical care
for the medically indigent from the various counties to
the health and welfare departments of this State and
wiU enable the counties to fulfill their responsibilities
for such care hy paying a maximum one-half ( 1h) mill
leYy. 'Vhatever the actu:1l levy is that the county finally
decides on after its consultation with the state department of public wclfare, the amount must be equal to
one-third ( 1/3) of the anticipated annual costs of medical treatment and hospitalization for the medically indigent, hut in no event shall such annual appropriation
be less than One llundred Dollars ($100).
Further cf feet of the new section is to make the
department of welfare completely responsible for the
administration of this program, including outpatient
care, emergency care, and all other benefits carrymg
to the medically indigent under Title 19.
All money appropriated by the county shall be deposited with the State Treasurer who shall credit the
same to the hospital and medical care account. Disbursements from the hospital and medical care account are
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to be made only for costs accrued m excess of care
limits otherwise established for the care of such patients
by the state department or division administering the
Public Assistance Act of 19Gl. Thus, it is possible to
envision circumstances whereby the county funds would
not be used for the treatment of the medically indigent,
but, rather, only the funds of the state department of
public welfare.
Further,

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

17-5-55.5

(Supp.

HlG7) prmrides that payments out of the hospital an<l

medical care account shall be made by the department
or the division of state government administering the
Public Assistance Act of l 061 and upon notification
to the county in which the indigent resides for whom
payment is being made and the county commissioners
agree. This provision was apparently inserted in order
to allow the local county commissioners to maintain some
control over their moneys they deposit in the hospital
and medical care account with the State Treasurer. The
implementation of this program was apparently to be
accomplished by the county commissioners as of July
1, 1967, by depositing the moneys they appropriated

for the medically indigent with the State Treasurer,
who was to credit the same to the hospital and medical
care account. This money would then be used by the
department of welfare to pay the county fees for the
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care of indigent people requiring medical aid and assistance.
Dated this 5th day of August, 1968.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Phil L. llansen
Attorney General Phil L. Hansen
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH

OPINION OF LAJV
No. 68-058
Requested hy Mr. B. H. Jlarris, Cache County Attorney, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah.
Prepared by Attorney General Phil L. llansen and
staff.
QUESTION
Does Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-55.5 (Supp. 1967)
relieve counties of caring for the indigent sick who are
not covered by medical programs administered by the
Utah State Department of Health and Welfare?
CONCLUSION
No.
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OPINION
On August 5, 1!:Hi8, this office issued an opnuon
construing the statutes of the State of Utah governing
the allocation of responsibility for the care of the State's
indigent sick. 1 I-Iowever, the discussion contained therein was not specifically addressed to the question now
posed, and it was believed that a further clarification
should be made to serve as a supplemental reference to
that initial effort.
The primarr and m·erriding concern behind the
enactment of Utah Code Ann.§ 17-5-55.5 (Supp. 1967)
was to provide a statutory vehicle which would enable
the counties to acquire available federal funds to help
defray the costs of caring for their indigent sick. The
statute has admirably served this purpose to the extent
the respectiYe counties have complied with its provisions
arnl have sought to utilize the benefits resulting therefrom.
There, nevertheless, rcmam certain persons who
are in fact indigent and in need of medical attention
who fall outside of the purview of Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-5-5;3.5 (Supp. 1967), in that they do not qualify
for hospital and medical care under eligibility requirements established by the Utah State Department of
IIealth and
elfare. Such persons, by reason of Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-55, still remain the responsibility of the State's respective counties:

';y

I

Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 68-052, August 5, 1968.
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. it is hereby made the duty of each board
of county commissioners to provide such care,
maintenance and relief for the indigent sick
and de pendent poor ....
In summary, this office is of the opm10n that the
counties of this state are relieved of the responsibility
of caring for the indigent sick only in those instances
where the indigent sick qualify for medical or hospital
assistance urnler programs administered by the Departn1ent of llealth and Welfare. This exception to the
general premise of county responsibility presupposes
county compliance with provisions governing the appropriation and remittai1ce of funds required for these
programs.
Dated this 27th day of Angust, 1968.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Phil I,, I-Jansen
Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

OI•'FICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH
OPINION NO. 69-053
April 17, 1969

REQUESTED UY:
lVI. Dayle Jeffs, Utah County Attorney
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PREPARED RY:
Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General
1-Iomer I-Iolmgren, Assistant Attorney General
QUESTIO:N"S:
If the county complies with the provisions and
payments set forth in 17-5-55.5, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, ·will this satisfy all obligations of the
county to medically indigent persons?
1.

If individuals are receiving welfare payments
under the Public Assistance Act of 1961, are they
thereafter no longer considered as medically indig:ent under the statutes and does the county have
any residual responsibility for medical care of persons recei,·ing welfare payments either through the
Public Assistance Act of 1961 or pursuant to
2.

l 7-5-55.5?

Can a county pay public funds in excess of
payments under 17-5-55.5 and the Public Assistance Act of 1961 for care and treatment of persons determined to be medically indigent?
3.

Does 17-5-55 and 17-5-55 ..5, imposing duties
upon counties to provide for relief for the indigent
sick, include mental illness?
4.

'"r

Does l 7-5-55.5 make the State Department of
Public
elfare the sole administrator of payments
for all medical care for persons determined to be
medically indigent in the State of Utah?
5.

85

CONCLUSIONS:
1.

Yes.

2.

No.

3.

No.

4.

No.

5.

No.

Section 17-5-5.5.5 imposes a mandatory requirement upon each County Commission to make a
levy not to exceed the "equivalent of % mill levy, which
in its judgment, based upon historical experience and
projectell need as determined in consultation with the
State Department of Public \Velfare, shall be equal to
one-third (1/3) of the nnticipatcd annual costs of medical treatment and hospitalization for the medically indigent, hut in no event ... less than $100.00. The money
is to be deposited with the State Treasurer in a hospital
and medical care account.
1.

'Vhen this is done the County has no further fin::mcial obligation with respect to the medically indigent.
This, of course, relates only to medical an<l hospital
care for indigents and does not relieve the County of
its obligation to care for indigents under Section
17-5-55, U.C.A. 1953. For fuller details on this question, see Attorney General Opinion No. 68-052, dated
August 5, 1968.
2. The 1961 Public Assistance Act was amended
in 1967 and again in 1969 by H.B. 347. We answer the
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second question in the light of the latest amendment
as it will be effective l\Iay 13, 1969.
Section 55-15-23 ( 6), as so amended by H.B. 347,
provides:
"The division (division of welfare) is
authorized to adopt policies providing medical
assistance for and in behalf of money grant recipients and for low-income medically needy
children and adults when income and resources
are insufficient to pay the cost of necessary
medical senices ... "It is declared to he the
intent of the Legislature that the most adequate medical care and services possible shall
he provided for those eligible; within the limitations of the appropriations made for the
biennium for the purpose of this subsection,
together with federal matching funds as may
be available."
"It is the further intent of the Legislature that the program of medical assistance
shall conform to requirements of the Federal
Social Security Act."
l•-.rom the fore going, it is clear that persons re·
ceiving welfare payments under the Public Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, are not to be considered, by
reason of receiving such grants, as being ineligible to
receive medical assistance from the Division of Welfare
in conjunction with Federal participation under the
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Social Security Act. There is no residual responsibility
in the County for medical care for persons receiving
welfare payments either through the Public Assistance
Act of HlGl, as amended, or pursuant to Section
17-5-55.5. Incidentally, the result would be the same
under the 191)7 amendment to the Public Assistance
Act of 1961.
Since Section 17-5-55.5 fixes the limits of the
responsibility of a County for care of the medically
indigent, it can not pay public funds in excess of the
payments called for by that section for aid to the medically indigent. Further, to do so would be contrary to
the provision in that section that eligibility to receive
medical and hospital care shall he determined by the
State Department of Public Welfare and should be
uniform in all Counties.
3.

The obligation of the County to provide funds
for the medically indigent is imposed by Section
17-5-55.5. \Vhether this would include so-called "mental
illness' would depend upon what is meant by the term.
\Ve assume it is used in the sense of mental abnormality
as distinguished from illness generally. In that sense,
the 1 . egisla ture has seen fit to draw a distinction behvcen medical care services and mental health services.
Separate appropriations are made for each. l\:Iental
health is covered by Chapter 17, Title 26, which sets up
a Division of :Mental Health under the Department of
Health and Welfare. Section 26-17-5 provides for
equitable distribution of funds appropriated or avail4.
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able for mental health programs. Cities and Counties
are authorized to estahlish local health authorities and
to provide mental health services. Fees may be charged,
hut services shall not be refused to any person unable
to pay therefor.
The word "medical" relates to the science of
medicine or to the practice or study of medicine. Since
the Legislature treats mental health in a category cliff erent from that of those "medically" indigent, it appears that mental health is not to be considered as being
included in Section 15-5-55.5, which deals with medically indigent.
It is Chapter 17, Title 26, that provides for the
care of the mentally ill without reference to indigency.
Local authorities and the State provide the funds to
carry on the mental health program under the administration of the Board of :Mental I-Iealth, a division of
the Department of I-Iealth and 'V elfare.

Payments for the hospital and medical services
provided for by Section 17-5-55.5 "shall he made by
the department or division of state government administering the Public .Assistance Act of 1961 upon notification to the County in which the indigent resides for
whom payment is being made and the County Commis·
sioners agree." This indicates that the State Department of Public "\Velfare does not have unfettered control over the funds deposited by the County from the
levy made to raise said funds. The County Commissioners must first be notified and also agree to the pay5.
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ment. In addition, "disbursement from the hospital and
medical account shall be ma(le only for costs accrued
in excess of care limits otherwise established for the
care of such patients by the department administering
the Public Assistance Act of 1961." This, conceivably,
could result in a situation which the County funds would
not he used as the f un<ls of the State Department of
Public 'Velfare might be sufficient to cover the costs
involved.
Respectfully Submitted

/ s/V ernon B. Romney

VERNON B. RO:MNEY
Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH
OPINION NO. 69-080
August 5, 1969
REQUESTED BY:
'V ard C. llolhrook, Executive Director
Department of Social Services
PREPARED BY:
Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General
Homer 1-Iolmgren, Assistant Attorney General
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QUESTION:
Can the Department of Social Services determine
and thus designate persons to be "medically indigent", as being limited to those persons who
qualify under the Federal Act as being "categorically related", and thus leave to the counties
the obligation to care for all other persons needing
medical assistance, as provided in Sec. 17-5-55,
U.C.A. 1953.
CONCLUSION:
Yes.
Under Section 17-5-55, U.C.A. 1953, the counties
were required to provide medical care to the indigent.
The 1967 Legislature added a new Section 17-.5-55.5
which pro,,ided for the levy of a tax by counties to
raise funds to be turned over to the State Treasmer
to be used by the Department of Public 'Velfare to
furnish medical assistance to those persons denominated
as "medically indigent'', and providing that the "eligibility requirements for hospital and medical care shall
be determined by the State Department of Public vVelf are and shall be uniform for all counties."
0 bviously Section 17-5-55.5 was not intended to
shift the entire burden imposed by Section 17-5-55 to
provide medical assistance to indigent persons from the
counties to the state, for it left to the Department of
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Public 'V elfare the determination of the person to be
considered as "medically indigent", and thus be eligible
to receive the assistance contemplated by that section.
Fm·ther, Section 17-5-55.5 was enacted to take advantage of the federal grants available to states having
a program to care for medically needy persons who
fell within the provisions of the federal act under the
term "categorically related".
It is our opinion that it is within the right and jurisrliction of the Department of Public vVelfare to limit

the persons who are eligible to receive the medical assistance available under Section 17-5-.55.5 to those persons who come within the term "categorically related"
under the federal act. Such limitation being in harmony
with the federal act, and qualifying the state to receive
federal financial assistance, cannot he classed as arbitrary capricious or unreasonable. As to all other indigent
sick, the counties have the duty of providing medical
assistance under Section 17-5-55.
Our conclusion herein is in harmony with Opinion
No. ()8-058, issued by the Attorney General August 27,
1!'68. Our opinion No. 69-053 is not in conflict with
this opinion. The questions answered in that opinion
were considered as being related only to Section
17-5-55.5. We did not in any wise attempt to designate
what persons belong to the class denominated as "med-
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ically indigent'', a matter wholly within the determina·
tion of the Department of Public Welfare.
Respectfully submitted,
/ s/Vernon B. Romney

VERNON B. RO:l\1NEY
Attorney General
j s/ Homer I-!olmgren

HO:MER HOLMGREN
Assistant Attorney General

